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Abstract 
 
Do power sharing institutions such as federalism and proportional representation 
(P.R.) mitigate the potentially negative effects of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on 
quality of government?  Numerous empirical studies have shown the negative effects 
of ethno and linguistic heterogeneity on indicators of government quality, such as 
corruption, bureaucratic impartiality, and institutionalized democracy.  Moreover, 
many studies have examined the effects of various political institutions, such as 
federalism and electoral system on government performance and corruption and found 
mixed results.  Yet this study seeks to appropriately join the two sets of empirical 
studies.  Building on Lijphart’s (1984) consociational theory of power sharing 
institutions, I seeks to empirically test the effectiveness of vertical (federalism) and 
horizontal (P.R.) power sharing in both homogenous and heterogeneous states using a 
variety of government quality indicators for robustness and generalizability.  I employ 
a sample of over 120 states from 1993-2004 and use a variety of empirical methods 
and data to test the notion that power-sharing improves government quality when 
heterogeneity is high.  The empirical results demonstrate that while differences in 
government quality are minimal when comparing federal and unitary states at less 
fractionalized levels, the institution of federalism proves extremely effective in 
producing significantly higher scores of government quality in highly fractionalized 
societies for almost every indicator using a number of multiple data sources. As for 
horizontal power sharing, while P.R. states report better government scores than 
countries which employ a method of plurality, this difference is negligible in cases of 
high fractionalization when controlling for federalism.   The findings strongly support 
one of Lijphart’s claims to the effectiveness of federalism in providing better 
government quality for diverse populations than those of centralized constitutions. 
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Introduction 
        Do certain political institutions mitigate the potentially harmful effects that ethnic 
and linguistic diversity may have on government quality?  In recent years, much 
scholarly attention has been devoted to the determinants of ‘good governance’.   Though 
there are numerous intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that provide 
oversight to governmental corruption and poor government practices, many states still 
display poorly functioning governments worldwide.  With many states such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Serbia and Ukraine in transition from some type of authoritarian regime 
seeking a more democratic constitution, the importance of understanding the effect of 
political institutions on quality of government is paramount for policy-makers.  Good 
governance, or more specifically those states with lower levels of corruption, higher 
bureaucratic efficiency, higher levels of democratic participation and competition and an 
impartial rule of law, has been associated with economic growth and overall better 
welfare for citizens (Mauro 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997; Kaufmann et al 1999; 
Adesera et al 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2007).  High levels of corruption, inefficient 
bureaucratic services and biased application of the law can cripple the entire 
democratization process and hinder a country’s growth.   
          Recent literature has demonstrated that the primary interests in ‘quality of 
government’ (QoG) is its effect on phenomena such as economic growth (North 1981; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 
Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004) or 
transitions to democracy (Weingast 1995; Johnson, Kaufmann and Schleifer 1997; Rose 
and Shin 2001; Zakaria 2003).  It is well established empirically that quality government 
institutions have a significant effect on such outcomes as economic growth and 
democratization.  This analysis builds on this relatively new and diverse empirical 
literature of understanding the correlates of government quality, particularly the 
institutional strand.   
        A number of recent empirical studies in comparative politics have focused on the 
determinants of government quality, particularly focusing on the quality of impartial 
institutions.  However, though multiple analyses have examined variation in corruption as 
determined by the presence or absence of such institutions as district magnitude, 
presidentialism, parliamentism and federalism to name a few (Persson et al 2003; 
Adesera et al 2003; Treisman 2000; La Porta et al 1999; Ades and De Tella 1999), there 
is conspicuously little understanding of how political institutions condition the effects of 
(or are conditioned by) other variables, such as ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity.  This 
study seeks to add to the literature by initiating a discussion on the conditional effects of 
political institutions by examining the interaction between two power-sharing institutions 
and societal fractionalization on QoG – federalism and proportional representation.   
        Thus the central research question in this study focuses on the comparative impact 
of power-sharing institutions, conditioned by fractionalization, on government quality.  
Thus I seek to test whether federalism and proportional representation affect a country’s 
government performance differently depending on whether that country is homogenous 
or heterogeneous ethnically or linguistically.  While it would be a daunting task for a 
government to alter its linguistic or ethnic demographic make-up, institutions on the other 
hand can be designed and/ or changed to meet the unique needs of a diverse (or 
homogenous) citizenry.  This study therefore seeks to address the question - are power-
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sharing institutions ‘better’ for a more diverse society in terms of good governance 
compared with states without such power-sharing?  This question has largely gone 
unexplored in a large-N comparative sense within the literature on federalism and 
electoral systems.  Using multiple empirical indicators for each concept presented, I test 
this central question empirically on over 140 countries representing each inhabitable 
continent and at various levels of economic and democratic development using three key 
indicators of government quality – corruption, bureaucratic quality and level of 
institutionalized democracy.   
  
Relevant Literature        
Fractionalization and Quality of Government 
        The crux of this analysis relies on the notion that ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
negatively impacts government performance.  Based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature, there is much reason to believe that a more homogenous society will be 
associated with better government performance compared with one that is fractionalized 
by ethnic or linguistic differences.  Simply speaking, more diversity can lead to more 
internal racism, prejudice, de facto segregation and possible conflict.  Speaking to the 
‘micro-foundations’ here, there is much theoretical reason to believe that individuals are 
more trusting of others that share similar ethnic, linguistic or religious traits than those 
that are different.  Grief (1993) demonstrates that in medieval times, traders formed trade 
pacts with those of a similar ethnic background in order to monitor cheating and enforce 
fair transactions.  When information among actors is asymmetric, La Ferrara (2003) 
shows that individuals in a market in which contracts cannot be legally enforced will 
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chose to do a transaction with someone who shares the same ethnic background because 
de facto reinforcement of a fair transaction is stronger than with someone outside one’s 
own ethnic group.   
       At the aggregate level, one can argue that Olson’s logic of collective action (1965) 
applies here in that the more groups functioning in a market; the more difficult it is to 
achieve the goal of the common good.  Applied to a political arena, each group will be 
seeking rents from the public provisions for their own benefit, thus making corruption 
more likely and overall quality of government will be diminished and the possibility for 
political instability might increase (Horowitz 1985).  Similar sentiments have been made 
with respect to ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalization being positive 
determinants of domestic or international conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Fox 2002; 
Huntington 1993; 1996).  Further, empirical studies analyzing government quality have 
found that more diverse societies on average have poorer government performance (La 
Porta et al 1999; Alesina et al 2003).  Moreover, Alesina et al (1999) find empirical 
evidence of economic patronage in U.S. states where there are high levels of ethnic 
fractionalization.  A corollary argument for high diversity resulting in poor government 
quality is that the majority group seeks to maintain power over other groups and in the 
process will exploit minority groups through corruptive practices.  Moreover, goods and 
services provided to ethnic or linguistically diverse citizens by government bureaucrats 
may be of poorer quality relative to more homogenous societies, with those in the 
majority group not wanting to allocate ‘their resources’ to individuals in minority groups 
and potentially could resort to corruptive practices in order to prevent such redistribution.  
Thus there are many theoretical and practical reasons to believe that more diversity in a 
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society has been empirically shown, ceteris paribus, to have a negative impact on QoG.  
Figure 1 demonstrates some empirical support for this claim using several leading 
indicators of ‘good governance’.   
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
 
Political Institutions that Lead to better Quality of Government in Diverse Societies: 
Federalism and PR 
 
        I argue that a conditional effect has been largely overlooked in the literature, in that 
power-sharing systems can mitigate the potentially negative impact of cultural diversity 
on government quality.  I build on the work of Lijphart (1977) who argues that federalism 
and proportional representation are two of the key institutions of a ‘consensus 
democracy’, allowing for multiple groups in society to have the opportunity to share 
power.  On federalism, Lijphart (1984, 1997) postulates that distinct ethnic and linguistic 
groups within a heterogeneous society should have corresponding political sub-national 
governments in which to conduct a number of policy avenues autonomously.  These 
fractionalized states promote accommodation of diverse interests by allocating legitimacy 
to said heterogeneous groups.  Lijphart essentially posits a ‘top-down’, elite drive theory 
in which leaders of diverse social groups that have their own legitimate sub-national 
governments work together and with the majority group at the national level.  Provided 
that local elections and a certain degree of provincial fiscal legislation are allowed, the 
cultural and linguistic identities of minority groups remain intact and protected by the 
government.  For example, the important policy areas include education curriculum and 
 4
right to teach a different language and history in schools, taxation levels, and local 
security and justice laws for example.  In order to preserve their status as regional leaders 
with a degree of legitimate power to lose, such elites persuade their voters to accept the 
status quo of the federal system.  With the consent of the minority and majority group 
elite members, the legitimacy and content of the systems among the citizenry begins.  
Over time, a stable, well governed country (relative to unitary states) is expected.  In 
sum, elites of multiple ethnic or linguistic groups will have much less incentive to fight 
the central government and will instead coalesce together nationally while simultaneously 
providing better governance locally to ‘their people’.   
 
 
Vertical Power Sharing: Federalism 
        Scholars have devoted much attention to the effects of political institutions on 
government performance.   In particular, federalism has drawn a number of critiques 
from academics and policy makers alike.   The empirical evidence is mixed on whether 
sharing of power inherent in federalism and PR leads to better governance, with one 
group of scholars finding that more decentralized states have higher levels of corruption 
(Treisman 2000; Gerring and Thacker 2004) and others finding empirical support for 
better governance (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Adesera et al 2003), others find insignificant 
results (Norris 2005). With respect to the empirical support for proportional 
representation, most scholars have found that the presence of a more inclusive electoral 
institution is associated with better government quality (Norris 2005, Persson and 
Tabellini 2002).  However, others have found insignificant results (Isaacson 2006).  
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Clearly more empirical work is needed to reconcile these findings.  This study serves as 
an extension of this literature. 
        As for the theoretical developments, some emphasize that federal systems are less 
likely to attract competent policy makers and bureaucrats at the regional and local levels 
because the benefits for such positions would be considerably less rewarding than similar 
positions at the central level.  Specifically, some scholars take issue with the notion that 
decentralized/ federal institutions lead to better political outcomes in heterogeneous 
societies.  Such scholars argue that corruption may be greater at the provincial and local 
levels possibly due to easier access to such policy makers when sought out by interest 
groups.  This scenario creates an environment where corruption and bureaucratic 
inefficiency are more likely at the regional levels, thus leading to poorer quality 
government in decentralized countries (Tanzi 1996; Brueckner 1999; Prud’homme 1995).  
Another argument along these lines is whether a federal structure could lead to less 
overall accountability if political decision making is made at multiple levels of 
government.  On one hand, voters have a more difficult time assessing blame for poor 
quality performance, thus giving some more of an incentive to extract rents.  On the other 
hand, bureaucrats and policy makers could theoretically be less coordinated among the 
levels of government, and with each level being equally corrupt; there could be a 
disproportionate amount of rent-seeking relative to more centralized states (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993).  Other potentially harmful aspects of federalism for good governance are 
intergovernmental competition, collective action problems, and confusion about decision 
rules also potentially exacerbates corruption and poor government quality (Gerring and 
Thacker 2004).   
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        Opponents of decentralized regimes also point to cases where high degrees of 
violence and subsequent breakdown of government has occurred in minority regions, 
such as Chechnya in Russia, Kashmir in India or the long history of terrorist strike from 
the Basque region in Spain.  Others will underscore how federalist institutions have failed 
to keep states intact altogether, such as in the case of the break-up of Singapore and 
Malaysia in 1965, Czechoslovakia in 1993, and the extreme case of Yugoslavia breaking 
into an all out civil war in the 1990’s.  Such critics assert that regionalism only 
encourages local minority elites to push for more power, not the status quo, thus 
increasing the likelihood for conflict and possible succession.   
         Conversely, the other side of the debate includes many facets as to why federalism 
and/or decentralization would produce better governance.  Since the writings of James 
Madison, proponents have argued that electoral accountability, regional representation 
serve as a political outlet for multiple distinct ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in a 
society.   On the economic side, the argument posited by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), 
elucidates the positive aspects of intergovernmental competition along with greater 
transparency at the local level for citizens.  Along the lines of firms operating in a free 
market, citizens, like customers, can freely choose the region in which they reside.  More 
corrupt provincial governments will pay the price for poor governance when citizens take 
up residence in better performing regions.  The competition creates a more open and 
efficient atmosphere and reduces the ability for central-level policy makers to collect 
rents (Weingast 1995).  A similar argument is made with respect to interventionist 
policies into the marketplace in that a federal structure discourages provincial 
governments from driving away capital from free-moving firms (Jin et al 1999).  Based 
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on this logic, lower levels of corruption from more decentralized governments are 
expected. 
         Persson and Tabellini (2000) elucidate the micro-foundations for the notion that 
decentralization reduces corruption and therefore improves government quality.  In 
unitary states, politicians are responsible for federal as well as a greater scope of local 
matters relative to federal structures.  Central government officials and bureaucrats are 
held responsible for aggregate results, and oftentimes their poor performance on regional 
issues could be overlooked. Thus in decentralized countries, where locally elected 
officials are more directly accountable, we should expect better government performance.  
The proliferation of power and accountability puts pressure on authorities at all levels to 
perform better because constituents are closer geographically and issue-wise to their 
political leaders than those in the federal capital, which may lead to improving 
government quality in federal countries. 
         This sentiment is echoed in a theoretical analysis by Ronald Watts (1999), in that he 
argues that one of the many virtues maintained by the advocates of federalism is that it 
can provide cultural and linguistic autonomy to various minority groups within a diverse 
society (Watts 1999).  In such a political structure, provincial governments constrain 
abuses of power at the central level directed at minority groups by offering diverse 
groups in society the authority to maintain their linguistic or ethnic integrity, as in the 
case with the Francophone population in Canada residing in Quebec.  Federal 
arrangements thus reduce the likelihood of potential abuses of power by the majority 
group at the central level by shielding the minority groups from domination.  These 
constitutional designs give individuals and minority groups protection from the center 
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while simultaneously interlocking decision-making on salient policy areas such as 
education, where the provincial governments can influence the decisions made at the 
central level.  Such an arrangement can lead to greater satisfaction and less incentive by 
central authorities to seek rents at the expense of other groups because there are fewer 
opportunities to do so relative to a more centralized, unitary state (Goodin 1996).   
        In exploring the emerging federal system in Russia, Simth (2000) argues that a 
federal democracy provides the most effective antidote to both minority and majority 
exploitation of diverse groups.  He argues that in the case of highly diverse countries, 
more coherent and legitimate policies will be enacted in a federal system than in one 
where power is asymmetrically consolidated at the top (Smith 2000).  Lijphart (1999) 
also points out that this was in fact the intention that the British had in establishing a 
federal system for the diverse population in India, along with the driving force behind the 
decentralization reforms in the newly federalized Belgian state along Flemish and French 
line (Lijphart 1999: 196-197).  If one of the virtues of federalism is that it increases 
satisfaction among diverse minority groups because they have more of an ability to 
govern themselves, all the while constraining actors at the central level from rent seeking 
at regional and local levels, then it should stand up to numerous empirical tests.  If federal 
constitutions are in fact ‘doing their job’, one way of assessing this would be to show 
empirically how heterogeneous states with federal systems have higher government 
quality and less corruptive behavior than those with unitary ones.  I therefore expect that 
various forms of fractionalization will have a different impact on government quality 
depending on whether the state is federal or unitary in its constitution.  The following 
hypotheses will thus be tested in this analysis: 
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H1: Federal states are expected to be associated with better government quality relative 
to unitary states.   
 
H2: In states with high levels of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity, federal states are 
expected to have the most substantial impact on government quality relative to unitary 
states.   
   
 
Horizontal Power Sharing: Proportional Representation (PR) 
         With respect to the second power-sharing institution in this analysis, proportional 
representation, said institution has drawn far less criticism in terms of its potentially 
beneficial impact on consensus-making and good governance.  However, the 
counterarguments have been made (Horowitz 1985, 1993, 2002).  First, electoral systems 
that do not require governments to obtain a clear majority-vote to win power have less 
incentive to reach out to other ethnic or linguistic groups during electoral campaigns.  
Conversely, they may in fact have a stronger incentive to ‘rally the base’ of their core 
constituents – those with similar cultural ties – thus alienating other groups.  Such an 
atmosphere may have significant negative effects on the legitimacy of a regime if it is 
perceived as biased in favor of select groups in society and antagonistic toward others.   
         Second, although PR allows for multiple parties to participate in the legislature, 
there is reason to believe that less consensus building is necessary relative to majoritarian 
electoral systems.  Ethnic and linguistic differences become reinforced and 
institutionalized over time by virtue of each group’s association with a particular political 
party.  Elite leaders in minority groups could be perceived as ‘selling out’ the interest of 
their constituents by bargaining with the majority party.  As regards to the electorate, 
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voters themselves would have little incentive if any to vote outside of their own ethnic or 
linguistic group.  In contrast, in a majoritarian electoral system, such leaders of ethnic 
and linguistic minorities would be forced to coalesce with other groups in society to go 
for ‘big tent’ political parties, in which many distinct segments of society all work 
politically under one party name.  To obtain and maintain power, elites from various 
groups would have to work together under one or two single parties, signaling to society 
their willingness to politically use cooperation and consensus over conflict.  Leaders of 
diverse groups would then have an incentive to signal to their community the legitimacy 
of, and to participate in, the system, thus reducing potentially harmful social tensions.   
         However, others assert that in this electoral system, groups at the national level 
have more opportunity to work together in consensus and coalition in proportional 
representation (PR) systems.  In contrast to a ‘winner take all’, where the majority group 
in society would have the greatest opportunity to win every election, thus essentially 
disenfranchising minority groups from politics, PR provides an avenue for diverse 
participation in federal governance.  Here again, Lijpart’s ‘consociationalist’ democracy 
concept argues that increases in the number of power ‘stakeholders’ in the legislative and 
executive branch has a positive impact on good governance.  PR with few exceptions is 
associated with multi-party systems (Duverger 1972, Cox 1997).  Without representation, 
minority elites are prone to expressing dissatisfaction with the system while 
simultaneously, majority elites in power have more opportunities to exorcise corrupt 
policies that benefit their core electorate and systematically discriminate against other 
ethnically or linguistically diverse groups.  With the possibility of such representation, 
the likelihood of executive power sharing increases.  Elites will have high turnout and 
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strong democratic competition within their community in order to participate in 
governing.  If successful at winning parliamentary seats, they will be eligible as coalition 
partners to larger parties and party heads are potential cabinet members in the ruling 
government.  Cabinet ministers from multiple groups in society will have the chance to 
run bureaucracies, thus governance is directed at the many rather than the few.  Lijphart 
points to European cases such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, in which PR 
power sharing has particularly benefited citizens in both the minority and majority in 
terms of overall government quality. 
 
H3: States using proportional representation (PR) are expected to be associated with 
better government quality relative to states with majoritarian or plural electoral systems.   
 
H4: In states with high levels of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity, PR’s impact is 
expected to be greatest on government quality relative to lesser inclusive electoral 
systems.   
 
 
 
Presentation of Data and Methods 
 
 The Dependent Variables        
         In order to test the full scope of the effect of power sharing institutions on 
government quality, I employ a number of dependent variables in the study.  According 
to the Quality of Government Institute1, the three core areas that serve as empirical 
proxies for ‘Government Quality’ as a concept are low levels of corruption, high levels of 
bureaucratic quality and effectiveness and strong democratic institutions and participation 
among a country’s citizens.  Due to admittedly problematic data a times with such 
                                                 
1 The Quality of Government Institute, founded by Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg, is based out of the 
University of Göteborg in Sweden.  It is a research organization committed to understand “how and under 
what circumstances high quality political institutions can be created”.  For more information, see: 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/
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concepts as corruption and level of bureaucratic quality, I utilize multiple proxy measures 
in order to account for any potential aberrations in the empirical findings.   
1. Corruption 
For the first set of dependent variables, measuring a country’s level of corruption, I use 
indicators from two leading sources.  The first is taken from the Political Risk Services 
Group’s (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  The PRS Group, a think tank 
specialized in economic and political risk assessment internationally, has published 
monthly data for business and investors on over 140 countries since 1980.  The PRS 
measure is primarily concerned with accounting for “excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business.”2  The time period ranges from 1984-2003 and has up to 139 
countries.  The data in the analysis has a finite range from ‘0’-‘1’, with higher scores 
indicating lower levels of perceived corruption. There are several advantages to this 
measure.  One, it is available for 20 years, which allows for any institutional reform of a 
country’s vertical or horizontal power sharing structure or structural shifts in domestic 
fractionalization. Second, it includes a wide scope of developed and developing countries 
so that the results of this analysis are highly generalizable.  It has also been used by other 
recent empirical studies (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003).   
        The second measure employed here to capture corruption comes from Transparency 
International, a non-partisan organization that has created the ‘Corruptions Perception 
Index’ (CPI), which ranges from 0-10, with higher scores indicating less corruption.  For 
example, in the 2006 rankings, Finland ranks highest (least perceived corruption) with a 
score of 9.6, while Angola ranks last (#142) with a score of 2.2.  The CPI score measures 
                                                 
2 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx  
 13
the “perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and 
the general public”3.  The CPI ranks more than 150 countries by their perceived levels of 
corruption in the public sector, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.  
The data in this analysis ranges from 1996-2006.   
 
2. Bureaucratic Quality 
The second set of dependent variables in the analysis seeks to capture the level of 
bureaucratic quality and effectiveness a state provides to its citizens.  Again, one of the 
two indicators of this concept comes from the PRS Group.  Measured from ‘0’-‘1’, a 
country receives a high score when “the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services” and a 
lower score when such a country “lack(s) the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy 
(and) receive(s) low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in 
terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.”4  This measure has 
the same number of countries and years in the sample as the corruption measure 
previously mentioned.   
        I take the second measure of bureaucratic quality from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators.  The World Bank is primarily focused on the ability of governments to 
produce and provide reliable and quality public provisions to its citizens.  Specifically, 
they code this variable on the basis of “the quality of public service provision, the quality 
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, and the independence of the civil 
servants from political pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
                                                 
3 See www.trancparency.org
4 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx
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policies”5.  This variable is available from 1996-2005, contains over 190 countries for at 
least one year and has a total of 1310 observations. 
 
The Independent Variables 
        There are several primary independent variables in the study that are important in 
order to test the various empirical hypotheses.  The first two are of course power sharing 
institutional variables – the presence of absence of an electoral system of proportional 
representation (PR) and federalism.  I take both indicators from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI, Keifer et al 2005).  Pertaining to a country’s electoral system, the DPI 
codes whether the lower house in the legislature elects a majority of its members by 
plurality vote, a mixed combination of plurality and PR vote or a majority of seats won 
by proportional vote.  I dichotomize this variable (PR), coding all countries ‘1’ that elect 
a majority of members into their lower house through a PR vote and all other states ‘0’.  
Those systems that are coded ‘1’ are Party list (open and closed) and Single Transferable 
Votes (STV).  Majoritarian electoral systems are thus First-Past-the-Post, Run-off-
Majoritarian with a second ballot, Block Vote Alternative Vote and Single Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV).  Hybrid or ‘mixed systems’ where a combination of the two 
systems are used, such as in New Zealand or Germany, are coded ‘1’ if the majority 
(50%+1) of the seats in the lower house are allocated via PR and ‘0’ if otherwise.  The 
DPI contains this variable from 1975-2004.  The second institutional variable in the 
model is the political structure of a country.  This dichotomous variable indicates whether 
or not a country has a federal or unitary political structure.  It is a dummy that is equal to 
                                                 
5 See www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4sra.html
 
 15
‘1’ if a country is a federal system and ‘0’ if otherwise.  There are several sources from 
which to take this indicator, (Persson and Tabellini 2003, Gerring et al 2005, Keifer et al 
2005) and in order to have the most possible continuity among the institutional variables 
in this analysis, I again elect to draw from the DPI6.  The DPI has 5 measures of sub-
national government authorities.  The measures important to this study are whether a state 
has provincial legislatures and if in fact they are locally elected rather than appointed by 
the central government and whether or not such provincial governments have “extensive 
taxing, spending or regulation authority.”7 These elements follow the standard of what is 
considered a decentralized or federal country.8
        The second important aspect of this study pertains to whether or not these power 
sharing institutions have a lesser or greater effect depending on if a country is 
heterogeneous or homogenous with respect to ethnicity or language.  I employ several 
measures to capture this effect.  The first two, linguistic and ethnic fractionalization 
respectively, are drawn from the study of Alesina et al (2003).  This measure made 
significant improvements over previous indicators of ‘ethnolinguistic fractionalization’ 
(Roberts 1962; Muller 1964; Mira 1964), which amalgamated linguistic and ethnic 
fractionalization into one measure.  Alesina et al (2003) distinguish between ethnic 
linguistic and religious fractionalization.  Values are calculated as one minus the 
                                                 
6 For missing data I also employ data from Ronald Watts (1999) 
7 See http://econ.worldbank.org
8 These indicators are selected according to Riker’s definition, where there are two key components to a 
federal state. First, there must exist two or more levels of government (central and provincial, etc.).  
Second, both (and/or all) levels must have constitutionally or legally recognized policy responsibilities that 
are independent of other levels of the government.   
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Herfindahl index of ethnic9, linguistic and religious group shares of the total annual 
population.  The figure essentially represents the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a country will belong to two different ethnics, linguistic or religious 
groups.  The index ranges from ‘0’ to ‘1’ with higher values equating to higher 
fractionalization.  The data is available from 1979-2001 and each of the three measures is 
computed for over 180 countries.  In order to avoid potential biases from one source of 
data, I include a third measure of a country’s level of heterogeneity from the study by 
James Fearon (2003), in which he creates a similar measure of “ethnic fractionalization” 
in which he identifies the probability of two randomly draw people belonging to two 
different ethnic groups.  Fearon codes this variable for 160 countries and restricts ethnic 
minorities in such countries as holding at least one percent of that country’s population.  
Similar to previous studies empirical findings (Alesina et al 2003; La Porta et al 1999), I 
anticipate that higher fractionalization will relate negatively with quality of government 
ceteris paribus.  However, the key to this analysis is that I intend to demonstrate the 
contextual impact of these power sharing institutions, meaning that when heterogeneity is 
high, the impact of federalism and PR are anticipated to being associated with better 
government quality than those of unity states with similar ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity.  I thus construct an interaction term with both institutional variables and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization to test for this effect.   
        A number of control variables are also included in the model to account for rival 
hypotheses.  Some studies have shown that states that are more developed economically 
                                                 
9 The standard Herfindahl index is:   
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and that are more open to trade have higher levels of government quality.  I include GDP 
from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al 2002) to account for economic development 
and trade openness, which is calculated as a country’s annual imports plus exports over 
its GDP.  I take country’s GDP per capita and lag it by one year.  I also account for a 
country’s level of democratic strength, using the measure for democracy from the Polity 
IV dataset (Marshal and Jaggers 2002).  The variable ranges from 0-10 with higher scores 
representing higher levels of democratic institutions.  I anticipate that democracy will be 
positively related to the dependent variable.  A number of empirical studies have found 
lower degrees of corruption in states with a free press (Brunetti and Weder 2003, Ahrend 
2002).  I use the Freedom House measure of press freedom, which scores states on a scale 
of 0-100.  I reverse the index so that higher scores indicate higher levels of press 
freedom.  Finally, a number of area dummies are included in the analyses.  All are 
dichotomous (0/1) indicators as to whether or not a country is located in Africa, Latin 
America or the Middle East10
        
Research Design  
 
        The research design of this analysis is separated into two parts.  The first part is 
designed as a preliminary analysis, designed to elucidate the bivariate effects of the two 
power sharing institutions on the quality of government dependent variables using each 
country’s level of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity as an intervening variable.  Thus I 
divide my entire sample into three parts according to each state’s relative level of ethnic 
                                                 
10 Additionally, I run all of the statistical models with country dummies of “developing” federal states in 
order to test the sensitivity of the institutional variables in the models, such as India, Malaysia, Columbia, 
Argentina and Brazil.  For a lack of space in the primary tables, their coefficients are often omitted, yet can 
be obtained by contacting the author.   
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and linguistic fractionalization – low, medium and high.  Then, the various aggregate 
levels of government quality indictors are compared between federal/ unitary and P.R./ 
non-P.R. states respectively at different levels of state-year heterogeneity.  For the sake of 
space, I compare the horizontal and vertical power sharing (or lack there of) at only low 
and high levels of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity and subsequently provide difference 
of means (1-sided) to demonstrate if there is a statistical pattern found in the data among 
states that have chosen these power sharing institutions and their level of government 
quality.  In order to avoid problems of bias by relying on only one data source for 
linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, I employ two in this study.  Both measures 
(Alesina et al 2003, Fearson 2005) are widely accepted in the empirical comparative 
politics literature and have been employed in other published works (Norris 2005, 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2007, Alesina and Spolare 2003).  Thus in this first section of the 
empirical analysis, I divide all of the state years in the sample into two groups – federal 
or unitary, and I do the same for P.R. or non-P.R. electoral systems.  I then compare 
scores of each of the 4 dependent variables at high and low levels of three different 
sources of cultural fractionalization – ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (from Alesina 
et al 2003) and ethnic fractionalization (from Fearon 2005) between the power sharing 
institutions.  This type of analysis is beneficial in a number of ways.  It demonstrates a 
basic understanding of how government quality relates to linguistic and ethnic 
heterogeneity.  Second, it is parsimonious and allows for simple difference of means 
testing.  Finally, it provides an interesting means with which to test preliminarily the true 
implications of what Lijphart and others have been advocating with respect to 
consociacialism, meaning whether these institutions provide elites of culturally 
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heterogeneous states legitimate mechanisms for cooperation and potentially better 
governance than compared with unitary or non-PR states. 
        After having established a basic empirical relationship between the effect of the two 
power sharing institutions at low and high levels of heterogeneity, I then move on to a 
time series, panel analysis for each of the dependent variables in the study, including 
interaction terms with the two power-sharing institutions and fractionalization.  This 
allows for a number of control variables to be included so as to account for rival 
hypotheses of what impacts ‘good governance’.  Though each of the quality of 
government indicators have different number years coded in the data, for example, the 
measure of corruption provided by Transparency International is from 1996-2006, while 
the PRS group provides the measures of corruption and bureaucratic quality from 1984-
2003, each of the dependent variables includes some element of diachronic variance, yet 
for the later I use 1993 as a the starting year due to data limitations and better comparison 
with the TI measure.  Therefore, autocorrelation needs to be considered in the analysis.  I 
accordingly run a Prais Winston model with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE’s) for 
each of the four dependent variables in the analysis in order to best avoid problems with 
serial correlation, which could bias the coefficients.  Following the advice of Ray (2005), 
I provide a baseline for each model, using only the key independent variables and 
economic development (log fog GDP per capita), before reporting the full models which 
include control variables.  Lastly, I take a stratified sample which includes only 
heterogeneous states in the analysis.  Here again, I seek to demonstrate that federalism 
and proportional representation have the most impact good governance when they are 
employed by a state with a fractionalized population.   
 20
 
Results 
 
        Table 2 reports a series of difference of means tests, with the number of state-year 
observations in parentheses, on government quality variables between federal and unitary 
states at low and high levels of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.  Table 3 reports 
similar difference of means testing, yet compares electoral systems rather than veridical 
power sharing.  One caveat that needs brief discussion is that in table 3 the number of 
observations for federal states are substantially fewer in number than those of unitary 
states.  However, there is little that can be done to remedy this issue, being that the 
majority of states in the world are, and have been, unitary ones.  I address this point only 
to alert the reader to proceed with some degree of caution in comparing the mean 
differences of the two samples in table 3.   
         Based on the results of these two tables, I find three noteworthy patterns.  First, my 
findings support previous empirical analyses (Alesina et al 2003, La Porta et al 1999), 
which suggest that fractionalization is negatively related with good governance.  Indeed, 
upon examination of corruption, bureaucratic quality and democracy scores between low 
and high levels of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization (electoral institutions aside), it 
appears that the greater the diversity of these two measures, the lower the quality of 
government, ceteris paribus11.   A second discovery in the data reveals that the impact of 
power sharing institutions is overall a positive effect on good governance.  For example, 
in each of the two tables, one finds only one comparison case in which the absence of on 
of the two poser sharing institutions receives a higher score on any one of the six good 
                                                 
11 There is one exception found in the data.  The score for PRS corruption is higher in federal states than in 
unitary ones in Table 2.   
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governance indicators12.  The rest of the comparisons demonstrate higher government 
quality scores for state-year samples containing federalism and proportional 
representation, which demonstrates some initial empirical support for the hypotheses that 
power sharing, has a positive impact on government quality.   
      Third, while both power sharing institutions seem to have a positive effect on the four 
measures of good governance relative to their absence, the strongest effects are found at 
different levels of heterogeneity.  For each of the difference of means comparisons, a %-
differences is reported to elucidate the gap between the two scores (federal vs. unitary, 
PR vs. non-PR).  Here we observe a distinct difference in which type of society each of 
these two power sharing institutions has the greatest impact.  While states that have 
adopted PR as their electoral system for the lower house have much stronger government 
quality scores at low levels of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, the gap narrows 
quite significantly for high levels of such fractionalization.  Most importantly, such 
differences between electoral systems fail to reach the 95% level of significance in all of 
the comparisons of corruption and bureaucratic quality.  For example, with respect to 
bureaucratic quality in terms of either the PRS or World Bank measures, there appears to 
be a minimal difference at most between countries with PR electoral systems compared 
with those PM or mixed-systems at high levels of either linguistic  or ethnic 
heterogeneity.  Further, there does not appear to be any systematic bias in the results 
between the two sources of fractionalization (either Alesina or Fearon), leading to the 
initial conclusion that PR’s most effective and largest impact on government quality 
                                                 
12 Unitary states with low linguistic fractionalization have higher T.I. corruption scores than federal ones, 
yet this relationship is not statistically different, while non-PR states that are linguistically heterogeneous 
have a higher PRS bureaucracy score than PR states, yet similarly, this difference fails to reach statistical 
significance.   
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relative to states without PR is found in states with lower levels of linguistic and ethnic 
heterogeneity.   
        Conversely, the strongest comparative impact of federalism on the measures of good 
governance relative to unitary states is found at high levels of linguistic and ethnic 
fractionalization.   Though Fearon’s data produces slightly weaker results for this 
discovery, when comparing the relative difference of government quality between federal 
and unitary states at low and high levels in either type of heterogeneity, the gap widens 
and the statistical difference between federal and unitary states becomes stronger in the 
Alesina et al (2003) sample in every case when fractionalization is high.  In sum, 
according to these initial results, I find that while fractionalization would appear to have a 
overall negative impact on government quality, two institutions may mitigate this 
potentially negative effect.  However, the two power sharing institutions impact 
government quality strongest at different levels of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, 
with PR having the strongest comparative effect on lower levels within homogenous 
states (relative to PM and mixed systems), while federalism’s impact (relative to unitary 
systems) is greatest in highly diverse states.   
 
***Insert Table 2 Here*** 
 
***Insert Table 3 Here*** 
  
       Tables 4 and 5 report the coefficients from the Prais Winston regressions for 
corruption, and bureaucratic quality respectively with standard errors in parentheses.  H1 
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and H3 are tested in each of the ‘full models’, while H2 and H4 are tested for by using an 
interaction term between the power-sharing institutions and fractionalization.  Upon 
initial examination, the preliminary analyses seem to be corroborated by these data.  
While they vary in statistical significance, each of the coefficients produced in the 
pooled, time series regression models for corruption, bureaucratic quality and 
institutionalized democracy is in the predicted direction, meaning that the power sharing 
institutions have an overall positive effect on government quality.  Table 4 lists 
regression analyses using the two different measures of corruption as the dependent 
variable, with each regression containing over 120 countries in their sample.  The 
baseline results, controlling for only economic development, are strong, in particular for 
proportional representation, which is strongly significant in the baseline models over the 
95% level of confidence.  The strength of the results diminish somewhat however, as the 
coefficient and significance level shrink when controls are added in the PRS group full 
model and the coefficient for PR drops to the 90% level of significance in the full model 
using the Transparency International data in the full model with controls.  Federalism, 
with weaker results than those of PR in the full sample models for corruption, is 
significant at the 95% level of confidence in the PRS data in the baseline model, but 
drops out in both of the full models for each of the dependent variables.   
        Looking at the interaction terms, it is clear that while the impact of fractionalization 
on the dependent variables is not conditioned by PR based on these results, the 
conditional effect of federalism is strong, with each interaction term significant at the 
95% level of confidence.  The effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is also in the 
predicted (negative) direction and significant in all but models 4 and 8, where it is 
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interacted with PR.  Thus when considering the conditional effect of federalism, the 
impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is negative and significant in unitary states.  
However, based on model 3 with the PRS data, this negative effect is strongly mitigated 
in federal systems, and is actually positive when taking into account the effect of the 
coefficients from federalism and the interaction term based on the results from the 
Transparency International data.   
        For both the PRS and TI data on corruption, the control variables are robust 
throughout the two full models, reducing the likelihood that there are significant 
measuring differences or biases between the two sets of time period and coding rules 
used by the PRS Groups and Transparency International.  As expected, free press and 
economic growth are associated with lower corruption throughout.  Surprisingly, though 
consistently in the expected direction, only two of the six coefficients for democracy are 
significant at the .05 level.   
 
***Table 4 Here*** 
 
***Table 5 Here*** 
 
       The baseline models in Table 5, which switch to bureaucratic quality as the 
dependent variable, are similar to those displayed in Table 4.  Though the results of the 
two power-sharing variables are stronger in both of the baseline and full models in Table 
5.   The coefficients reported in the baseline models are positive, significant and robust 
throughout the two sets of data.  In the full model using the economic, political and 
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geographic control variables, federalism is strongly robust, and is associated with 
improved bureaucratic quality, ceteris paribus.  For example from models 2 and 6, 
holding all other variables in the model constant, a country that is federal is likely to have 
a 0.094 higher PRS rating and a .116 World Bank rating for bureaucratic quality and 
services relative to a unitary state.  Conversely, the measure for PR has a weaker effect in 
the full models on bureaucratic quality.   
        The models with the interaction terms again display the negative impact of 
fractionalization in unitary and non-PR states as being strongly significant and robust.  
Yet only federalism appears to offset this negative impact when bureaucratic quality is 
the dependent variable.  Similarly to Table 4, the result in table 5 suggest that the impact 
of higher degrees of fractionalization in federal state is significantly mitigated, while the 
additive effect is positive based on the results from the World Bank data.  Again, neither 
interaction term in the PR models are significant at even the 90% level of confidence, 
which suggests that in cases of higher fractionalization, instituting federalism as a power-
sharing institution is a much more effective way of producing better government 
performance than instituting PR.   
        As in the preceding models in Table 4, the controls in Table 5 are as expected, with 
again, free press and economic growth positively affecting the dependent variables 
throughout each of the regressions, while some other area dummies, such as the Middle 
East and Latin America, show a negative impact on bureaucratic quality, all things being 
equal.   
 
***Table 6 Here*** 
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        Table 6 serves to empirically examine hypotheses (2 & 4) from a different angle by 
including only those state years that are coded as ethnically or linguistically 
heterogeneous13.  Also, this table is used to test the robustness of the results by 
employing a number of different measures of fractionalization.  In these models, the same 
estimates are made as in models 2 and 6 (‘full models’) from tables 4 and 5, with each 
being a Prais Winston time series models with standard errors in parentheses.  Though 
they contain the full set of control variables used in Tables 4 and 5, yet to save space they 
have been omitted from the presentation14.  Judging by the significance of the 
coefficients for all three types of government quality, it is quite clear that based on the 
time period and the diverse data sources employed in this analysis that the institution of 
federalism is much more effective at producing the opportunity for ‘good governance’ at 
high levels of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity relative to the institution of proportional 
representation.  Regarding corruption, the predicted increase in the dependent variables 
when a shift to a federal design is implied ranges from 9.5%-14-6% for the PRS data and 
between about 22.5%-35% based on the data from Transparency International.  
Conversely, none of the coefficients on behalf of PR reach even the 90% level of 
confidence, meaning they are statistically indistinguishable from plurality or mixed-
systems when they are used in a heterogeneous state, ceteris paribus.   Similar results 
follow when the two sources of bureaucratic quality are used as the dependent variable.  
Federalist states on average outperform their unitary counterparts when heterogeneity is 
                                                 
13 Following the coding rules of Norris (2005) I code all state-years that receive a fractionalization score 
above .5 as ’heterogeneous’ in both the Alesina and Fearon data.  This implies that the odds of picking two 
random citizens of different linguistic or ethnic background respectively is 50% or greater.  An additional 
benefit to this coding rule is the addition of a number of extra state-years that might be omitted if the 
threshold were to be higher.   
14 For a list of the full results, contact the author.   
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high irrespective of the data used for fractionalization or the dependent variable.  The 
predicted difference between unitary and federal states for diverse countries according to 
the PRS sample is between 13%-18%, while based on the World Bank data is between 
31%-44%.   
 
Conclusion  
 
       Studying the determinants of government quality is imperative for political scientists, 
economists and policy-makers alike.  ‘Good governance’ has been associated with greater 
satisfaction and participation among the citizenry, economic growth and more foreign 
investment.  This analysis has examined the effects of two power-sharing institutions, 
federalism and proportional representation and their effect on government quality 
indicators.  Upon final review, the data show strong support for the predications of 
Lijphart and others that advocate the benefits of consociational institutions for quality 
governance.  Of particular importance, this study has thoroughly examined four leading 
government quality variables while testing the effects of the primary institutional 
variables when ethnic and linguistic diversity is at a relatively high level, using two 
sources of fractionalization.  The empirical findings of this analysis imply a number of 
interesting conclusions.  First, the empirical results demonstrate that higher levels of both 
linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity are associated with lower government quality, 
according to almost every test conducted using each of the indicators for corruption and 
bureaucratic quality.  This finding is also consistent with most other empirical analyses 
that explore the relationship between fractionalization and good governance variables (La 
Porta et al 1999; Alesina et al 2003, Adsera et al 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2005).  As 
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not all fractionalized states govern poorly, it is incumbent for researchers to determine 
what may lead these societies to better quality governance.   
        Second, the results show that power sharing institutions have varying effects 
depending on the level of societal fractionalization.  Judging by the regression models 
with no interaction terms, using the full sample of states (tables 4-5); it appears as though 
PR has a greater impact on improved government quality.  The results demonstrate 
similar conclusions when comparing the PR to the majoritarian electoral system scores of 
both types of government quality in table 6 for low levels of ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization.  This implies that states with more homogenous populations are, and 
would be, more likely to have governance than those homogenous states with more 
restrictive electoral systems.  Thus is appears that consensus building by elites at the 
central level through multiple political parties encourages better governance in more 
homogenous populations.   
       Conversely, the vertical power sharing institutional, federalism, is much more 
effective in producing better governance at high levels of ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization.  In each of the tests – whether difference of means, the interaction terms 
or in the stratified samples – it is clear that the data show federalism to being an effective 
institution for better governance at high levels of heterogeneity compared with unitary 
states.  PR was not found to have a substantial impact on quality of government 
indicators when comparing PR to majoritarian electoral systems in more heterogeneous 
states.  While this finding was apparent in the preliminary results in Table 2 with no 
control variables, it held up strongly in the other tables when controlling for economic, 
democratic, free press and regional dummies.  Interestingly, both power-sharing 
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institutions are associated with better governance scores for each type of ‘quality’ 
indicator, yet their effect appears to be conditioned on the context of societal 
heterogeneity.  While there are certainly questions regarding data reliability in measures 
of any one of the three abstract concepts analyzed as the dependent variables in this 
study, the results are robust when testing the institutional variables using a number of 
reputable sources as well as using diverse measures of fractionalization.   
        The implications of these findings certainly have bearing for policy-makers and 
academics alike.  As for future academic scholarship on how political institutions affect 
economic, political and social outcomes, this analysis recommends a serious 
consideration of the impact of context – be it in the diversity of a country’s 
demographics, its location geographically or potentially other factors as well.  For 
example, a number of previous empirical studies displayed mixed results on the effects of 
federalism and its relationship to ‘good governance’ variables yet overlooked the 
intervening variable explored here.  For policy makers, choosing the correct political 
institutions that will encourage leaders to govern in the most effective and least corrupt 
way is obviously something to be desired.  For plural societies, the evidence strongly 
suggests that federalism improves government quality from its more inclusionary aspect 
of local autonomy for distinct ethnic and linguistic groups and the elite consensus 
building that it encourages at the central level.  Allowing minority groups a sense of 
autonomy while keeping the federation intact certainly seems to produce higher quality 
outcomes than unitary institutions. Yet, however tempting it would appear that PR and 
federalism could provide a panacea to poorly performing governments with low and high 
levels of heterogeneity respectively, other factors surely were significant in influencing 
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the quality indicators as well.  Regionalism for example, plays a significant part – states 
embedded in regions without strong democratic traditions certainly proved to be lacking 
in overall government quality.  However, there is little that can be done about changing a 
country’s position geographically.  Other factors that can be improved upon are economic 
growth and human capital along with strong democratic competition need to be 
encouraged as well.  Though political institutions such as those analyzed here can filter 
behavior of elites and encourage better governance, quality government performance will 
most likely be effectively achieved through a number of social and economic policies that 
encourage cooperation and prosperity for a wider scope of the citizenry.   
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Table 1 -  The Relationship Between Ethnic Fractionalization and Quality of 
Government 
                
 Governance  Level of Ethnic Fractionalization  
 Quality Indicator   Low Moderate High   
           
 Corruption   .612 .566 .434   
 (n=2470)          
 Bureaucratic Quality  .645 .584 .386   
 (n=2470)          
             
 note: Aggregate state-year scores with number of state-year observations for each    
 level of ethnic fractionalization.  Corruption and Bureaucratic quality    
 measures come from the PRS Group.  Higher scores of all three    
 indicators signify 'better governance' for each variable (i.e. lower corruption, etc.)   
 Fractionalization values taken from Alesina et al (2003) and divided equally into low,   
 moderate and high levels.       
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Table 4 - Effect of Power Sharing Institutions on Government Corruption    
           
   Corruption 1   Corruption 2   
   (PRS Group)    (Transparency Int'l)    
   Baseline Full Model Fed*Frac PR*Frac Baseline Full Model Fed*Frac PR*Frac 
Power Sharing 
Institutions                 
Federalism (0/1)  .028*** .014 .032**  .060 .030 .031  
   (.007) (.011) (.011)  (.048) (.021) (.021)  
Proportional Rep. 
(0/1)  .073*** .047***  .089*** .680** .439*  .605* 
   (.004) (.011)  (.004) (.261) (.233)  (.349) 
Fed*Fractionalization     .051**     .839**  
      (.023)     (.382)  
PR*Fractionalization      -.155     -.559 
       (.089)     (.779) 
Control Variables                   
Fractionalization    -.163** -.135*** -.119   -.923** -.535** -.673 
     (.072) (.012) (.102)   (.474) (.234) (.528) 
Institutionalized democracy   .003 .004 .003   .067** .030 .071** 
     (.002) (.027) (.025)   (.033) (.038) (.033) 
Press Freedom    .001*** .004*** .002***   .014*** .022*** .015*** 
     (.0004) (.0002) (.0003)   (.004) (.005) (.004) 
GDP Per Capita   .067*** .059*** .069*** .065*** .552*** .774*** .751*** .747*** 
   (.001) (.018) (.008) (.013) (.057) (.078) (.078) (.079) 
Middle East    -.045*** .032 -.042*   .592 .886 .209 
     (.018) (.122) (.022)   (.315) (.183) (.316) 
Africa     -.016 .007 -.041   -.007 .229 .228 
     (.024) (.009) (.220)   (.031) (.169) (.283) 
Latin America    -.147*** -.043*** -.083***   -.812*** -.285** 
-
1.101*** 
     (.017) (.010) (.015)   (.272) (.140) (.258) 
Constant   
-
.030*** .629*** .751*** .604*** -.561 3.835*** 4.981*** -1.514** 
      (.007) (.043) (.023) (.098) (.389) (.382) (.491) (.719) 
Obs.   1801 1160 1160 1180 1138 654 654 654 
# of Countries  136 125 125 127 161 122 122 122 
Rsquared   .36 .51 .55 .54 .45 .65 .64 .64 
                      
note: Prais Winston Model with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (in parentheses).     
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01         
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Table 5 - Effect of Power Sharing Institutions on Government Bureaucratic Quality   
           
   Bureaucracy 1   Bureaucracy 2   
   (PRS Group )     (World Bank)    
   Baseline Full Model Fed*Frac PR*Frac Baseline Full Model Fed*Frac PR*Frac 
Power Sharing Institutions                 
Federalism (0/1)  .066*** .094*** .081***  .153*** .116** .283***  
   (.017) (.009) (.008)  (.047) (.054) (.089)  
Proportional Rep. 
(0/1)  .060** .025***  .008 .147*** .057  .124 
   (.031) (.008)  (.016) (.051) (.045)  (.077) 
Fed*Fractionalization     .019**     .299**  
      (.009)     (.151)  
PR*Fractionalization      .024     .160 
       (.036)     (.154) 
Control Variables                   
Fractionalization    -.123** -.108** -.102**   -.258** -.222** -.374*** 
     (.045) (.037) (.043)   (.099) (.106) (.113) 
Institutionalized democracy   .001 .002 .002   .005 .003 .005 
    (.002) (.002) (.003)   (.013) (.012) (.013) 
Press Freedom    .012*** .011*** .012***   .012*** .011*** .011*** 
    (.002) (.002) (.002)   (.001) (.001) (.001) 
GDP Per Capita  .093*** .101*** .099*** .111*** .448*** .409*** .404*** .417*** 
   (.007) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.015) (.024) (.018) (.018) 
Middle East     -.131*** -.122*** -.129***   -.104 -.098 -.122 
     (.025) (.031) (.036)   (.087) (.073) (.075) 
Africa     -.011 -.051 -.012   .095* .084 .126** 
     (.051) (.044) (.059)   (.058) (.061) (.061) 
Latin America    -.207*** -.199*** -.208***   -.459*** -.471*** -.435*** 
     (.009) (.013) (.007)   (.061) (.060) (.061) 
Constant     -.228*** -.271*** -.295*** -3.511*** -2.413*** -2.401*** -2.42*** 
        (.043) (.068) (.046) (.111) (.259) (.238) (.237) 
Obs.   1801 1190 1160 1180 1219 746 746 741 
# of Countries  136 128 125 127 169 151 151 150 
Rsquared   .34 .71 .73 .73 .50 .73 .74 .74 
                      
note: Prais Winston Model with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (in parentheses).       
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01         
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Table 6 - The Effect of Power Sharing Institutions on Government Quality in     
Heterogeneous Countries with Predicted Change in Government 
Quality     
    Linguistic   Ethnic   EthnoLinguistic   
Dependent Variable Ind Var. 1 Pr. % Chg 2 
Pr. % 
Chg 3 
Pr. % 
Chg 
          0' to '1'   0' to '1'   0' to '1' 
1. Corruption               
PRS Group 765, 960  Federal .055** 10.0% .079** 14.6% .053** 9.5% 
(N=42, 50)   (.024)  (.311)  (.025)  
   P.R.  .046 n/a .049 n/a .064 13.5% 
    (.033)  (.034)  (.032)  
Trans Int'l 105, 125  Federal 1.029** 25.1% 1.199*** 35.2% .984*** 22.4% 
(N=56)    (.452)  (.363)  (.356)  
   P.R.  -.463 n/a -.108 n/a .063 n/a 
2. Bureaucratic Quality   (.451)   (.530)   (.493)   
PRS Group - Obs.  765, 960  Federal .063 13.31% .092* 17.7% .070** 13.3% 
 (N=42, 50)   (.033)  (.051)  (.036)  
   P.R.  .007 n/a .013 n/a .004 n/a 
    (.023)  (.021)  (.012)  
World Bank  378, 398  Federal .732*** 43.9% .846*** 37.6% .702*** 31.1% 
(N=53)    (.151)  (.106)  (.126)  
   P.R.  .039 n/a .017 n/a .033 n/a 
        (.062)   (.073)   (.040)   
                    
note: Prais Winston time series model accounting for autocorrelation employed.  Coefficient reported with standard deviations in parentheses 
Number of observations (Alesina et al, Fearon) are listed by the data source followed by the total number of countries in each model (N=…) 
Pr. % Chg. '0' to '1' implies the predicted change in the dependent variable from unitary to federal and plural to PR respectively and is listed if the   
coefficient is statistically significant above the 90% level of confidence      
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List of States         
                    
Albania  
Costa 
Rica†  Indonesia  Mongolia  Spain**†  
Algeria†  Cote d'Ivoire Iran  Morocco  Sri Lanka†  
Andorra  Croatia†  Iraq  Mozambique Sudan  
Angola†  Cuba  Ireland†  Myanmar  Suriname  
Argentina*† Cyprus†  Israel†  Namibia†  Swaziland  
Armenia  Czech Republic† Italy**†  Nepal  Sweden†  
Australia*  Czechoslovakia Jamaica  Netherlands† Switzerland*† 
Austria*†  Denmark†  Japan  New Zealand†† Syria  
Azerbaijan  Dominica  Jordan  Nicaragua†  Taiwan  
Bahamas  Dominican Republic† Kazakhstan  Niger  Tajikistan  
Bahrain  Ecuador  Kenya  Nigeria*  Tanzania  
Bangladesh  Egypt  Korea, North Norway†  Thailand  
Barbados  El Salvador  Korea, South Oman  Timor-Leste 
Belarus  Equatorial Guinea Kuwait  Pakistan*  Togo  
Belgium*†  Eritrea  Kyrgyzstan  Panama††  Trinidad and Tobago 
Belize  Estonia†  Laos  Papua New Guinea* Tunisia  
Benin  Ethiopia   Latvia†  Paraguay†  Turkey†  
Bhutan  Fiji  Lebanon  Peru†  Turkmenistan 
Bolivia†  Finland†  Lesotho  Philippines** Uganda  
Bosnia & Herzegovina** France  Liberia†  Poland†  Ukraine  
Botswana  Gabon  Libya  Portugal†  
United Arab 
Emirates** 
Brazil*†  Gambia  Liechtenstein† Qatar  United Kingdom 
Brunei Darussalam Georgia  Lithuania  Romania†  United States* 
Bulgaria†  Germany*†† Luxembourg† Russian Federation** Uruguay†  
Burkina Faso† Ghana  Macedonia  Rwanda  Uzbekistan  
Burundi  Greece†  Madagascar  Sao Tome & Principe† Venezuela*†† 
Cambodia†  Grenada  Malawi  Saudi Arabia Vietnam  
Cameroon  Guatemala  Malaysia*  Senegal  Yemen  
Canada*  Guinea  Maldives  Serbia & Montenegro Zambia  
Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Mali  Seychelles  Zimbabwe  
Chad  Guyana†  Malta†  Sierra Leone   
Chile**†  Haiti  Mauritania  Singapore    
China  Honduras  Mauritius  Slovakia†    
Colombia†  Hungary††  Mexico*  Slovenia†    
Congo  Iceland†  Micronesia  Somalia    
Congo, Democratic 
Republic India*  Moldova†  South Africa*†   
                    
*Indicates a federally coded state        
**Coded as federal in robustness check       
†Indicates state with a PR electoral system       
††Coded as PR in robustness check        
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